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1. Introduction
The development of British capital markets has been the focus of a series of recent studies 
by both historians and economists. One phenomena in particular has captured the interest of 
researchers- the substantial decline in interest rates on government long-term debt in the early 
eighteenth century. Those rates fell from a high of 14% in 1 693 to a low of 3% in 1 726. While 
scholars unanimously agree that a sustained decline in long-term rates began sometime between 
1 693 and 1 730, they offer different theories to explain the timing and the pace of the decline. 
For simplicity, these theories can be grouped into three categories: credible commitment (North 
and Weingast 1 989), liquidity (Neal 1 990), and revenue collection (Brewer 1 989). 
North and Weingast ( 1989) explain the decline in the interest rate on government loans 
m terms of the institutional innovations spawned by the Glorious Revolution ( 1688- 1692). 
Before 1 688 the Crown issued no long-term debt. Instead it raised a portion of its revenues 
though short-term forced loans-loans that did not require Parliamentary authorization. These 
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relatively small loans were treated by the monarchy as the functional equivalent of taxes. The 
Crown even leveled severe penalties on those who chose not to "lend." Kenyon (1 978), for 
example, asserts that in 1 627, Charles I backed up a new forced loan using imprisonment as a 
means of coercion, successfully squeezing nearly £250,000 out of the nation in almost twelve 
months. 
Moreover, the repayment of forced loans by the Crown was unpredictable. Ashton ( 1 960) 
states that the forced loan of 1 604-05 was still due as late as December 1 609. In addition to 
being slow in making payments, the King, Ashton reports, defaulted on severalforced loans, even 
though such defaults damaged his reputation and made it more difficult to borrow in the future. 1
North and Weingast argue that the reason the Crown did not engage in long-term 
borrowing before 1693 was because of an inability to make credible commitments. It was not 
until the institutional innovations resulting from the Revolution emerged, that placed Parliament 
in charge of the purse and led to the establishment of the Bank of England, that the government 
was able to float long-•�rm debt In North and Weingast's view, these changes, constraining the 
monarchy "to obey a set of rules that [did] not permit leeway for violating commitments", 
reshaped fiscal and government institutions, and tied the monarch's hands (p. 804). The result 
was a new relationship between the Crown and potential lenders-a relationship that was 
immediately reflected in the form of a sharp drop in public long-term interest rates after 1694. 
Neal ( 1990) presents an alternative explanation for the decline in interest rates. Beginning 
in 1 693, the British government acquired additional revenues by issuing non-callable, "life" 
annuities. These assets were typically 99 years or more, funded by taxes, and could not be 
passed down to heirs without a change of title. According to Neal ( 1990) these assets were also 
highly illiquid, creating problems for their owners "because of the awkwardness of transferring 
title on these securities from one owner to another. .. annuity holders could not easily realize their 
implied capital gains." (p. 1 3) They also created difficulties for the government because they 
were non-callable; that is, the government could not redeem them earlier than the original date 
Defaulting through inflation was not chosen by the government at this time, evidenced 
by the steady price level over the period from 1650 through 1750. See Mitchell ( 1962, 
pp. 468-469) for a price index. 
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specified (usually 99 years). Thus, the government could not take advantage of declining interest 
rates in the short-run, which cost them a great deal because most of the annuities were issued at 
very high interest rates. The government offered the annuities at high interest rates because 
investors would not purchase assets that were highly illiquid unless they were compensated for 
the risk of owning such assets. 
Neal posits that the disastrous South Sea incident fortuitously led to a solution to the 
liquidity problem. The government enticed annuity holders to transfer their long-term assets into 
South Sea Company stock-stock that was experiencing rapid appreciation. Investors agreed to 
convert, according to Neal, because the new assets were liquid and promised significant financial 
gains. Unfortunately for the investors, the "Bubble" burst and prices plummeted. The Bank of 
England saved the market from utter chaos by converting South Sea stock into a new form of 
easily transferrable annuities. These new assets were long-term, perpetual annuities with the 
desirable characteristics of being callable, more easily transferrable, and funded by tax revenues. 
Lenders no longer needed to be compensated with high interest rates for investing in highly 
illiquid assets because the new debt instruments were much more liquid: 
These new annuities (e.g., three-percent consols) attracted the public because of 
the relative ease by which it could be acquired and disposed of, the clear terms 
of the interest payments and the readily available information about its current 
price . . .  (Neal, 1 990, p. 14) 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the consols became the primary instrument through 
which government long-term debt was issued. Neal credits the government's abundant use of 
these new liquid assets for the sustained low interest rates after 1727. 
Brewer ( 1989) offers a third, somewhat different explanation for the decline in long-term 
government interest rates. After the Glorious Revolution, Parliament relied on taxes (indirect and 
direct) and loans (short-term and long-term) to provide revenue for the government. Short-term 
loans were unfunded, and they were paid sequentially.2 These two characteristics created a great
deal of problems. for the lender-the lender was forced to wait until it was his turn to be repaid, 
2 As each lender purchased an asset, his name was written in a log. Each lender would be
repaid in the order that his name appeared in the log. 
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and, because war expenditures and the interest on the current national debt demanded most of 
the state's tax revenues, this wait was often longer than he originally anticipated. Brewer 
summarizes this point: 
As the size of the short-term debt increased, so it took longer for creditors to cash 
their departmental bills. It became harder or more expensive for the government 
departments to secure goods on credit because suppliers knew that the size of the 
debt lengthened the time they would have to wait for repayment. (p. 1 16) 
The problem caused by unfunded, sequential repayment- was temporarily avoided by 
converting short-term debt into long-term loans. Long-term loans, as their name implies, did not 
require repayment of the principal as quickly as short-term loans. This conversion, however, 
created a new problem--funding the long-term debt. To prevent defaults on loans, as had 
occurred in the past, the Parliament promised to back them with tax revenues. Thus, the success 
of long-term government loans depended crucially on the effectiveness of the tax system. As 
Brewer ( 1989) writes, "The repeal [of taxes backing up a loan], thereby removing the security 
of a particular stock, would have been a gross breach of public confidence and a threat to the 
security of public credit." (p. 1 19) 
The tax system was revised significantly after 1 7 1 3 .  In particular, the Treasury came to 
rely heavily on indirect taxes (e.g., excises) rather than direct taxes (e.g., land taxes). According 
to Brewer, the excise tax became the tax of choice for the English Parliament because "it was 
a comparatively discrete tax levied on a sizable but limited number of commodities" for which 
there existed a sustained (i.e., inelastic) demand (e.g., necessity goods) (Brewer, 1 989, p. 101) .  
This new type of tax and method of collection stabilized revenues and gave lenders a sense of 
security (beyond a verbal pledge by Parliament) that their loans would be repaid in full and on 
time. The government no longer had to offer extremely high premiums as it did in the 
1690s-lenders did not face as high a risk of default as it did then and therefore did not require 
compensation. Thus, Brewer credits the transformation of the tax system for the sustained 
decline in interest rates after 1 7 1 3. 
All three theories described above have problems,- either in the logic of their argument, 
the empirical methods they used, or both. North and Weingast claim interest rates declined 
substantially after the Glorious Revolution, but they do not have any pre-Glorious Revolution 
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data upon which to make this comparison. Only short tenn loan rates are available before 1688. 
and they cannot be used to approximate what long-term rates would have been, particularly 
because several short-term loans were forced-far more a tax than a loan. They claim that a 
post-1694 drop in long-term interest rates was due to the new institutional situation (in particular, 
the creation of the Bank of England), but without any pre-'innovation' long-term interest rates 
to compare with, it is hard to substantiate their conclusion. 
Second, it is difficult to believe that majority rule institutions are able to commit to any 
long-term agreement. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), for example, examine Congress' inability 
to commit themselves to a budget-actual deficits always exceed the "binding ceilings" passed 
by Congress. They state that: 
Members of Congress cannot commit either themselves or future Congresses to 
binding levels of revenues, spending, or deficits. They cannot do so through 
structure ... nor through any fonnal procedure .... Although Congress has made 
spending decisions under the auspices of many different procedures and 
organizational arrangements, none have served to prevent congressional parties 
from pressing on with their policy priorities. (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991, p. 
90) 
In recent years, more often than not, Congress has either deactivated budget enforcement 
provisions that it previously established or has provided enough loopholes so that the ceiling 
would not be quite so binding (e.g., certain parts of the federal budget, such as federal pensions, 
were immune from automatic spending cuts specified in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins, 1991, pp. 83-84). The same hand that locks the door also holds the key to reopen 
it when needed. 
The constant opening and closing of the "spending" door is the byproduct of a politically 
divided institution governed by majority rule. The British Parliament of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century was no closer to being a homogeneous voting body than the present U.S 
Congress. It was composed ofmany factions-. factions usually based . on the Tory and Whig 
party lines. Each party tried to undermine the power of the other and set its own agenda by 
manipulating the Crown and the Treasury (Plumb 1967). Given that majority rule governments 
today (like the U.S. Congress) find it difficult to honor commitments, it is hard to believe that 
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over two centuries ago Parliament was, without question, able to honor all of its long-term loan 
agreements. 
One might argue that the incentives to cooperate might change if the members of 
Parliament themselves were heavily investing in government annuities. If this point was true, 
then Parliament would be more likely to honor its promise to back all long-term debt to insure 
that its members would receive their profits from the investment. Members of Parliament (or 
individuals representing them), however, do not appear to have held a majority of government 
long-term debt (at least not before 1715). For example, Dickson ( 1967) reports that merchants 
invested heavily in the 1697 long-term loan. Most members of Parliament invested their money 
in land, and thus, were concerned with affairs that might affect them due to their land holdings 
(e.g., land taxes and the Land Bank proposal).3 They did not have their own interests to protect
as far as investment in government long-term annuities was concerned; therefore, they would not 
have been more motivated than predicted above to honor their commitment to earmark long-term 
debt. 
Finally, the method North and Weingast used to measure the decline in the risk due to 
the lack of commitment associated with government loans is problematic. To properly test for 
a decline in the riskiness of an asset, the asset must be compared to a similar, but less risky one. 
A decline in government long-term interest rates need not have been the result of reduced risk, 
if the rates on similar, less risky investments were declining at the same rate. 
In contrast to North and Weingast, Neal believes that high interest rates were demanded 
because these long-term loans were very illiquid. Once a secondary market developed, the risk 
involved with purchasing long-term debt diminished; thus, investors no longer demanded such 
high premiums, and the interest rates on public long-term loans declined. Indeed, from 1693-
1726, government nominal rates declined substantially; however, rates on private long-term loans 
did not fall. 
3 The ill-fated Land Bank was created to serve as an institution through which long-term 
paper bonds could be issued against the security of land. Its creators (primarily Tories 
in Parliament) wanted "ready money for the state and gentleman, not long-term loans on 
the security of land such as modem mortgage banks offer" (Clapham, 1944, pp. 33-34). 
The bank never succeeded in this endeavor and was dissolved in 1697. 
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These private assets were callable, long-term loans, with term lengths of 99 years or more. 
Although they were governed by usury laws that prohibited the interest rates tied to them from 
rising higher than 5% or 6%, for most of the period, the rates rarely reached these levels.4 More 
important, the private market suffered from many of the same liquidity problems as the public 
market because most loans were hard to sell or transfer. Clark ( 1988) highlights the illiquidity 
problem by showing that no well defined secondary market existed to bring together buyers and 
sellers. Hence, we would expect lenders to react similarly towards purchasing private or public 
debt. That is, if Neal is correct, then in the early period (pre-1720) we should see lenders 
demanding a premium on the illiquid, private, long-term debt and, in the latter period (post-
173(}--after capital markets have become fairly well-developed), lenders no longer demanding 
such high premiums. Private rates, however, fluctuated between 3% to 5% from 1693 to 1800 
with no apparent downward trend. Lenders do not appear to have demanded a premium in the 
private markets for illiquid long-term debt as they did in the public markets. 
Additional problems with Neal's liquidity argument still need to be addressed. For 
example, the long-term loans of the 1690s and early 1700s provided substantial profits for 
lenders. Why would investors want to sell an asset, one that guaranteed them the highest 
possible yield for this time period, especially if they saw interest rates declining, on average? 
Only the risk that the government would not meet its interest payments or the appearance of a 
more lucrative asset to invest in seem legitimate answers. Indeed, the government realized the 
latter point and made investment in South Sea stock appear quite appealing so that lenders would 
willingly convert their annuities into stock. Brewer ( 1989) concurs: 
The chief obstacle to such a scheme [converting government annuities into South 
Sea company stock] was ... [that] the holders of the irredeemable [non-callable] 
annuities ... needed to have a motive to relinquish their high return securities. (p. 
125) 
The lenders chose to convert their assets into South Sea company stock, creating the 
Bubble, becausejt appeared that .the new.investment would bring.them even higher returns than 
4 From 1651-1714, the usury limit was 6%. After 1714, it dropped to 5% (see Homer, p.
126). From 1688-1760, private rates hit this ceiling only three times. 
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their long-term annuities (see Dickson, 1967, for a detailed account of the South Sea Bubble). 
If lenders valued liquidity as much as Neal implies, then the government would not have had to 
entice them as they did to convert their long-term illiquid assets. Thus, it was the profitability 
of the scheme more than the gain in liquidity that led lenders to convert their lucrative long-term 
annuities into South Sea stock. 
Moreover, after 1693, the English Parliament, which controlled the government's purse, 
was particularly cost-conscious. Their "promise" to earmark revenues to cover long-term debt 
issued was intended, in part, to control excessive government spending-a trait of the early 
Stuarts that they did not wish to emulate. In keeping with this philosophy, Parliament 
presumably would have chosen the most inexpensive instrument available when it issued long­
term debt. Thus, if illiquidity was the principle cause of costly high interest rates on government 
long-term debt, we would expect Parliament to have issued debt that was liquid in the first place 
or to negotiate new terms with lenders to make the loans more liquid.5 
From 1693-1715, however, Parliament chose large denomination, long-term annuities and 
actually converted much of the more liquid short-term debt into long-term, highly illiquid 
annuities (Dickson, 1967, p. 1 1 6). We must conclude, then, that the extremely high interest rates 
of the early long-term annuities were not principally caused by illiquidity. Lenders did not 
demand a premium on long-term loans because of their illiquidity, otherwise, we would have 
found Parliament issuing more liquid debt to avoid paying such high interest premiums. Indeed, 
if investors were primarily worried about illiquidity, then the government would not have had 
to offer such a lucrative investment opportunity to get investors to convert their highly illiquid, 
long-term annuities into more liquid debt (e.g., South Sea stock). Thus, while increased liquidity 
made buying and selling of assets easier, Neal 's argument does not explain why the government 
would use such a costly instrument to collect revenue, why the government had to entice 
5 Illiquidity .. is not a problem if investors can borrow against the paper debt, as they do 
today. I was unable to locate any evidence of such transactions occurring over this time 
period. The lack of evidence implies that capital markets were either not developed 
enough to allow this type of transaction to occur, government annuities were considered 
too risky to allow owners of such debt to borrow against them, or such transactions did 
occur, but I failed to locate evidence of them. 
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investors to get them to convert their highly illiquid, long-term annuities, or why the interest rate 
on long-term debt still fluctuated significantly after 1 7 1 9  (from 3% to almost 6% on government 
consols). 
Brewer's argument, while plausible, is also problematic. Brewer claims that the revised 
tax system stabilized government revenues, thereby decreasing the risk of government default on 
loans. He believes investors acknowledged the decline in risk and, thus, no longer demanded 
high interest rate premiums. Stabilized tax revenues, therefore, led to lower, sustained interest 
rates. The tax system Brewer describes, however, is endogenously related to the interest rate 
premium. If the risk of lending to the government increased, and lenders demanded a premium 
to be compensated for the increased risk, then the government would need to earmark more 
revenues to meet the higher interest rate payments. One way to do this is by increasing taxes. 
Thus, we have both stabilized tax revenues lowering interest rates and high interest rates 
increasing tax revenues. This endogeneity problem makes statistical testing difficult because we 
cannot identify the direction of causality or even if it is appropriate to try to define the problem 
this way. 
In addition, Brewer states that stabilized tax revenues significantly lowered the risk that 
the government would default on its debt. This statement is true as long as the government does 
not subscribe loans to the limit of its revenue source. If it subscribes to the limit and there is 
a revenue shortfall, then it may default on its debt. Indeed, if the government has no incentive 
to limit its spending, then the risk of default exists no matter how much tax revenue it collects. 
The only spending "safeguard" for the British government during this era was the promise to fund 
long-term debt-but this promise, under a majority-rule system, is not binding. Thus, while 
Brewer's argument seems plausible at first glance, it is not only difficult to test because of an 
endogeneity problem but it also does not address how binding (if at all) were government 
spending limits. 
After reviewing Brewer's argument, as well as North and Weingast's and Neal' s, we find 
ourselves questio:n:in:g"1lre-miswers .they have offered us. · Their hypotheses are beset by numerous 
problems. Keeping this in mind, this work will make use of historical documentation as well as 
quantitative methods to test a new hypothesis: the risk premium (and interest rate) fluctuations 
following the Glorious Revolution were primarily a function of financing a series of large-scale 
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wars-not the lack of credible commitment, illiquidity or tax revenue instability, but the risks 
associated with waging war. These risks-the Crown being deposed by adversaries (particularly 
foreign ones) in the event of losing a war and the government defaulting on its loans because of 
the great financial burden placed on it during wartirne---contributed by far the most to the 
fluctuations in the risk premium, making the English government appear less credit worthy to 
investors and, subsequently, costing the government a great deal to issue debt. 
2. Overview
This analysis incorporates several research techniques to advance the argument that 
England's involvement in large-scale wars largely explains the fluctuations in the risk premium 
demanded for government loans.6 First, the historical overview links the political turmoil during
the period to the financial instability of England. In the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, 
England was involved in a series of major wars (Table 1), and the need to finance military 
activities placed significant financial demands on the Crown. Because of advances in military 
technology by the end of the seventeenth century-the introduction of the musket, the 
development of large standing armies, and the adoption of "more ambitious and complex 
strategies designed to bring these larger armies into action"-the costs associated with waging 
war rose steadily, and tax revenues were not sufficient to cover them (Parker, 1988, pp. 1-2). 
It became increasingly difficult to finance a war. The problem was magnified by the failure of 
Parliament and the Crown to agree on the method for raising revenues. 
Before 1688 Parliament's main source of influence came from its right to approve new 
taxes. Though the King had considerable discretionary power over how revenues were raised and 
spent, he needed Parliament's consent to increase tax revenues. Parliament, comprised mostly 
of large landowners who disliked higher land taxes, refused, with increasing frequency, to agree 
to raise direct taxes (e.g, land taxes) (Kenyon, 1978, p. 39). To obtain additional funds, the King 
6 Barro (1987) examined the relationship between military expenditures and government
long-term interest rates (post 1729). His results support the theory that military 
expenditures affected fluctuations in government interest rates, but does not attribute this 
to any risks the government is facing, nor does he test his results in a similar fashion. 
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borrowed extensively, but he often was slow or even failed to honor his financial commitments. 
Defaults, however, made future borrowing both more difficult and more costly-the high interest 
rates charged on Crown loans surely reflected at least in part the uncertainty of repayment. 
In addition, the probability that the current monarch would be deposed by a foreign power 
rose substantially during war. This was particularly true during the Nine Years War (1689-1697) 
against France. In 1688 after William III and his army invaded England and took control of the 
country, James II fled to France for safety. Louis XIV backed James II; therefore, the threat of 
James II returning to power-an event that would occur if France defeated England-and of 
reinstating the Crown' s  monopoly on all government policies, was real. People did not want to 
fund a soon-to-be-deposed monarch or government system. The Treasury had to offer high 
interest rates if people were to invest despite their fears. 
Thus, the interest rates charged the government for loans may have reflected both the risk 
of default by the government as well as the risk of default rooted in a potential change in 
government power (particularly after losing a war). The greater the degree of risk involved, the 
higher was the interest rate charged to the Crown relative to the "risk-free" rate. The high rates 
charged on Crown loans, and the problems inherent in obtaining any loans at all, persisted well 
into the eighteenth century. 
The graphical comparisons and econometric analysis provide additional quantitative 
evidence that the fluctuation in the interest rate premium over the period was in response to the 
risks associated with war. A decline in long-term government rates alone may not reflect a 
decline in risk if rates on a similar, less risky asset are declining as well. Hence, a better 
measure of risk than that proposed by North and Weingast is the difference between the interest 
rate on two similar assets-one risky and one riskless. Since no entirely riskless asset exists, this 
analysis uses a relatively safe asset-land based life annuities (hereafter known as private long­
term loans)--to measure the risk premium associated with risky government loans. Graphs of 
both rates show the trend in the risk premium over the period. 
Perocapita:mi:litary.·experrditures-a proxy for the level of the government's war-time 
involvements-and dummy variables representative of the three theories discussed in this paper 
are incorporated in both a graphical and econometric analysis designed to examine the 
relationship between these factors and the risk premium, primarily to show which factor accounts 
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for most of the variation in the risk premium. 
The quantitative analysis will show that from 1 693-1800, the risks associated with defeat 
in war were reflected in the premium charged on government loans. That is, lenders will try to 
compensate themselves for the risk by purchasing long-term debt if the interest rate is high 
enough to outweigh the risk factor. Other factors that could possibly affect the interest rate 
premium-----such as a credible commitment on the part of the Parliament, greater asset liquidity, 
or a stabilized tax system-----play smaller roles. If there exists a strong correlation between the 
instruments cited above (i.e., interest differential and war expenditures), it will provide support 
for the thesis that factors other than liquidity or institutional innovations played a significant role 
in shaping the structure of the pre-industrial market for government debt. 
3. Methodology and Results
To properly analyze the decline in the interest rate premium, we would ideally compare 
rates on two similar debt instruments over a fairly long time span. Unfortunately, no such series 
exists. The data from 1650-1 693 are very limited-neither non-callable nor short-term private 
loan rates are available. While long-term private annuities are available, the first government 
long-term loans did not appear until 1 693; therefore, any quantitative analysis is restricted to the 
post-Revolutionary period. Government short-term rates are scarce from 1 650-1 800, and nothing 
comparable exists on the private side. 
From 1 693- 1750 most government interest rates were tied to long-term, non-callable 
annuities, and private interest rates came from land based, long-term, callable annuities. Both 
types of annuities required yearly payments to the lender and were usually contracted for term 
lengths of 99 years or more (hence, these loans were known as "life" annuities). With callable 
annuities, however, the borrower could repay the loan earlier than the date specified in the 
original contract (Neal, 1 990, pp. 93-94). While the term length on the government loans is 
similar to the pr�vafo1oans,-theredeemability of the latter clouds immediate comparisons between 
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the two.7 
Also, expected short-term rates cannot be used to generate long-term rates because these 
two debt instruments are not directly comparable. While the expectations hypothesis of the term 
structure of interest rates leads to the conclusion that investing in short-term bonds gives exactly 
the same expected return as investing in long-term bonds, the theory says nothing about risk 
(Brealey and Myers, 1 990, pp. 572-3). If government long-term loans were available prior to 
1 688, a lender who invested in them would face greater risk than a short-term investor. If the 
King was replaced by a non-hereditary ruler (i.e., someone outside of the royal family), the new 
King did not necessarily have to honor the previous monarch's contracts; thus, lenders would risk 
non-repayment if they made long-term loans to the government. 
Even when hereditary succession occurred, rulers did not always behave responsibly. For 
example, during the reigns of James I and Charles I, forced loans were collected but not repaid 
on time or in full. Hereditary succession did not make either James I nor Charles I more 
responsible towards his commitments. This flagrant attitude towards the repayment of loans 
contributed to the latter ruler's overthrow and execution. The frequent turnover of rulers in the 
seventeenth century-from the Stuarts to Cromwell back to the Stuarts and then to the House 
of Orange--did not guarantee continuity in policies, especially since many of the new rulers 
gained office after their predecessor had been overthrown. Thus, the risk involved with lending 
on a long-term basis makes it impossible to equate expected short-term with long-term rates. 
Short-term rates, therefore, cannot serve as a proxy for long-term rates before 1693. 
If one assumes, however, that immediately following the Glorious Revolution funds were 
always borrowed for use in the near future, then a rough comparison can be made between 
callable private rates and non-callable government rates of the same term length. If interest rates 
fell ,  borrowers would call in their callable loans and recontract at the now lower rates. If, 
however, interest rates rose, borrowers of callable loans would not recontract; thus, their behavior 
would be the same as borrowers of non-callable loans. Lenders would also treat the two types 
7 The government made their annuities non-redeemable to make them more attractive to 
lenders; thus, lenders benefitted if interest rates declined because the government would 
be locked into the higher rates. This situation is precisely that which occurred in Britain 
from 1 690- 1 7 1 5. 
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of loans differently-the difference depending on whether they expected interest rates to rise or 
to fall. They would charge a premium on callable loans, if interest rates were expected to fall, 
else they would lose even more money to borrowers recontracting at the new, lower rates. 
Thus, if we compared private callable with private non-callable debt, the interest rates of 
the former should never fall below the interest rates of the latter because of the premium charged 
by lenders for callable loans. As a result, the risk premium associated with government loans 
(i.e., the interest rate differential) may be underestimated; however, even if the size of the interest 
risk premium is biased downward, the results of this analysis remain significant. 
Figure 1 shows that the government long term rates, while declining, do not converge with 
private rates until 1715, and after that year, periodically fluctuate above private rates.8 The first 
few observations of government rates-as high as 14%-are surely due to the uncertainty 
regarding the long-term survival of the new government (see Table 2). The interest rates on the 
primary source for government borrowing before 1693-short term loans-ranged from only 6% 
to 10% in the decade 1'efore the Revolution.9 The premium associated with the 1693 and 1694 
observations capture a heightened measurement of risk. If William III and his militia had lost 
the Nine-Years War, James II would have been reinstated as King of England. A strong believer 
of "the Divine Right of Kings", James II would have returned as sole authority over government 
policies, eliminating or certainly curtailing Parliament's role in most financial matters. 
Great uncertainty existed regarding William III's ultimate success. The 1693 loan was 
issued by Parliament following significant French victories in the Netherlands. Louis captured 
Mons in 1691 and the fortress of Namur in 1692 (Harris, 1963). The 1694 loans were issued in 
close succession following the bloody defeat of the British army at Landen. In both instances 
a defeated William came back to Parliament to request additional revenues to increase the size 
of his army-an army that was substantially smaller than that of the French. Many of the 
members of Parliament as well as the general populous were dissatisfied with William III' s 
8 
9 
The points graphed in the figure are the exact data points collected (53 points total). 
Linear interpolation was used to fill in gaps. 
See The Calendar of the Treasury Books, Vol. VII and VIII, pp. 64, 303, 380, 436, 604, 
and pp. 73, 285, 334, 388, respectively, for some examples. 
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performance as King of England (they believed that he put Dutch interests ahead of English 
during the Nine Years War). By examining Figure 1 and Table 2 closely, we see a pattern 
developing. The early long-term loans, issued by Parliament primarily to fund the Nine Years 
War, carried interest rates significantly higher than those loans issued after the war concluded. 
A significant military setback proceeded most of the high interest loans issued between 1693-94. 
After the war concluded, however, Parliament raised £2,000,000 by issuing an 8% annuity. The 
loan was fully subscribed without any difficulties, unlike the 1693 and 1697 war-time loans 
which did not attract investors. Thus, the drastic decline in long-term interest rates was not a 
result of either Parliament's credible commitment or the creation of the Bank of England, as 
North and Weingast suggest. The risks the government faced during the War, particularly that 
it might be overthrown and James II reinstated as King, drove investors to demand compensation 
(in the form of high interest rates) for investing in government debt, particularly after significant 
military setbacks. Once peace was declared, long-term interest rates declined. 
In addition to the uncertainty regarding the war and the monarchy, the system of 
earmarking revenues to support particular loans was still in its infancy-Parliament was 
struggling to maintain its commitment to back loans to the Crown. The financial demands placed 
on the government during the war greatly exceeded the revenues coming into the Treasury. Thus, 
the uncertainty of loss of war and dissatisfaction with William combined with fears regarding the 
ultimate redeemability of the loans to produce the very high premium on the first public long­
term loans issued in the early 1690s. 
In 1709, a series of events led to a near crisis in the English government, and they explain 
the resurgence of high interest rates in 1710-1712. Dickson (1967) summarizes these events: 
By Michaelmas 1710 the debt amounted to well over £6m., about a year's 
revenue. Simultaneously, the triumphant military and economic progress of the 
Allies began to falter. The failure of the negotiations for peace at the Hague in 
August 1709 was followed in September by the bloody and equivocal battle of 
Malplaquet. Further, the iron winter of 1708-9, which froze the rivers all over 
Europe, paralyzed commerce ... In 1709-10 the bankruptcy rate rose sharply in 
Londorr:and .Amsterdam. 
These shocks to the delicate spider's web of European commerce were 
bound to affect the credit of the English government, particularly as rumours grew 
in the early months of 1710 that Godolphin [the finance minister] was about to be 
dismissed. (p. 362) 
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The uncertainties surrounding military defeat, temporary trade disruption, and 
governmental upheavals combined to produce the high rates demanded by lenders on government 
long-term loans during the period. "With the approach of peace in 1713'', Dickson (1967) states, 
"it was possible to reduce the interest on Land Tax loans to five per cent" (p. 363). In addition 
to the Land Tax loans, the government long-term loans issued after 1712 also reaped the rewards 
of peace--substantially lower interest rates. 
Large drops in nominal government rates occurred at the end of other wars as well. Once 
conflict was resolved and peace declared, the demands for additional.revenue lessened. Without 
the uncertainty of the war's outcome, Parliament no longer needed to offer so large a premium 
to attract risk-averse investors. The lack of large war demands was reflected in the sharply lower 
rates offered for loans in 1697, 1713, and, to a lesser extent, in 1749, 1763 and 1784. 
Moreover, contrary to the North and Weingast argument that the drop in interest rates was 
a sharp, downward trend, an examination of real long-term government rates indicates otherwise. 
To adjust nominal rates for inflation, an expected inflation rate was calculated from an adjusted 
price index. The expected rate was calculated as a weighted average of recent changes in a 
yearly price index (p,-p,.1). The weight-distributed over five year intervals-reflected the 
influence of each year on future inflationary expectations.10 A five year weighting scheme was 
chosen because five years seemed long enough to pick up any possible lagged expectations 
regarding changes in prices. A two year weighting failed to capture the lagged effects and a ten 
year one added very little new information-" The resultiug estimates of the real rate (Figure 
10 Three different weighting schemes were computed: 
(I) An equal weight--each year influenced inflationary expectations equally; thus, 
each year's price differential was multiplied by .2. 
(2) An increasing weight--the earliest year in each five year interval influenced 
expectations least; thus, each year in a five year period was multiplied by the 
increasing series 1/15, 2/15, 3/15, 4/15, 5/15, respectively. 
(3) A decreasing weight--similar to the increasing weight except the last year in 
each fi.ve year interval influenced expectations least; thus, the series of weights
used were 5/15, 4/15, 3/15, 2/15, l/15, respectively.
" The average inflation rate over the entire period is constant; however, especially early in
the period, there are year to year fluctuations in the price indices. These fluctuations 
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2) support the conclusion that a sustainable downward trend in government long-term rates and
the interest rate differential does not occur until after the end of the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1713). The differential rises noticeably during the other major wars of the eighteenth 
century-the War of Austrian Succession (1739-1748), the Seven Years War (1756-1763), and 
the American War (1775-1783). 
In the analysis of the relationship between military campaigns and the premium charged 
for government loans, an index of military expenditures was used as a proxy for the level of the 
government's military involvement.12 No national income figures exist for this period; 
therefore, a crude measure was calculated using yearly wage figures multiplied by the total 
population size. 13 Total military expenditures were then divided by this estimate of national 
income to obtain an approximate index of relative military expenditure.14 
After 1688 the Crown was required by law to obtain Parliamentary permission for all new 
loans including loans needed for military expenditures. Often permission to market these large 
loans was granted in rapid succession-some were separated by only a week.15 Loans for the 
purpose of supporting the Nine Years War against France, for example, were issued on 8 
February 1694, 23 March 1694, and on four occasions during April 1694. William III requested 
money from Parliament as he needed it to continue his military campaign; there was no attempt 
to accurately forecast future military expenditures during this period. The same lack of planning 
appears to have characterized the reign of Queen Anne and to a certain extent, of King George 
I. 
cancel each other out when an average inflation rate is calculated. 
12 A record of England's yearly military expenditures has been kept by the Department of 
the Treasury since 1688. See the British Parliamentary Papers (Vol. 35) for an exact 
breakdown of all military expenditures. 
13 The nominal wage series and population figures can be found in Wrigley and Schofield's
The Population History of England (1541-1871), Appendix 9, pp. 638-641, and Appendix 
3, pp; 527 ,535;· respectively. 
14 Dividing military expenditures by population only would yield a comparable per capita
military expenditure measurement because wages were fairly constant over the period. 
15 Interest rates and military expenditure data are available from the author upon request. 
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Moreover, the loans were most often well in excess of the expected state revenue in the 
year that they were required. Government income, obtained mostly through various taxes, rarely 
covered the loan requests (Dickson, 1967, pp. 50-52). Thus, any risk associated with these loans 
should be reflected in the premiums of the same year. If a loan for military purposes was 
requested in 1693, the credit markets would reflect this demand in the interest rate charged for 
loans in 1 693. The interest rate differential was, therefore, regressed on military expenditures 
of the same year. 
In addition to military expenditures, dummy variables were included in each regression 
to represent the theories posed by North and Weingast, Neil, and Barro. To estimate the long-run 
effect of an event on the interest rate differential, a dummy variable representative of the entire 
period following each event was created; for example, if the Bank of England was created in 
1694, the dummy variable would cover the entire time-span following its creation. This method 
of analysis should provide an approximation of each event's long-run effect on the differential. 
The three dummy variables are as follows: 
1 )  d(l697-1800): The institutional innovations that North and Weingast ( 1989) claim 
forced the government to credibly commit-placing Parliament in charge of the 
government's purse and creating the Bank of England-were fully established by 
1697. If these institutions explain any changes in the interest rate differential, 
their effect should be captured in the coefficient of the dummy variable defined 
for the period following 1 697. While the historical analysis conducted above 
significantly diminishes the strength of their argument, a dummy variable was 
created to quantitatively test their argument. 
2) d(l714-1800): Brewer claims that the period beginning with the succession of
George I was particularly important for England's financial revolution because the
tax system was revised. By relying primarily on indirect taxes, the government
.. coul<l :appoinLits own .professional employees_ to administer. the tax, rather than 
deal with the "hodge-podge of amateur and local officials" who handled the 
collection of land taxes (Brewer, 1 989, p. 100). Thus, a dummy was created to 
capture the renovation of the tax system. 
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3) d(l726-1800): The period following the South Sea Bubble was marked by the
increased liquidity of government assets. Neal credits the creation of a secondary
market for the sustained downward decline in government interest premiums
witnessed after 1721. The dummy variable reflects the period beginning with the
issuance of the first government "consols"-treasury bonds that were highly
transferrable.
The interest rate differential was regressed on military expenditures and different 
combinations of the dummy variables. A test for multicollinearity of the independent variables 
revealed no problems of this type. Neither first nor higher order serial correlation was detected. 
The results are reported in Table 3. From the results of the first regression, we see that military 
expenditures are significant at the 95th percent level-they appear to explain at least part of the 
changes in the interest rate differential (i.e., the null hypothesis that B=O can be rejected). The 
variable's positive coefficient indicates that as military expenditures rise, the interest rate 
differential rises also. To provide a more tangible measurement of the effect that a change in 
military expenditure would have had on the differential, the greatest change in military 
expenditure over the period (maximum expenditure - minimum expenditure) was multiplied by 
the B coefficient obtained from regressing the interest rate differential on military expenditures. 
The result obtained reflects a change in the interest rate differential equal to .03 per observation 
for the regressions. These figures are equal to about a 30% change in the interest rate 
differential over the period. Thus, the largest drop in military expenditures over the period 
appears to have accounted for about one-third of the drop in the interest rate differential. 
Military expenditures explain more of a change in the risk premium on government long-term 
interest rates than any of the dummy variables. In the second regression, the period variables for 
1697-1800 and 1714-1800 were significant while in the first regression, the variable for 1726-
1800 was not. While the North and Weingast dummy variable was slightly larger than the 
Brewer dummy:v.ariabl:e::in the·second·regression, the difference between the two is insignificant. 
The size and significance of the dummy variable coefficients, however, are questionable 
for two reasons. First, the regression is biased towards the dummy variable with the longest 
time-span, the North and Weingast variable. Because the data series declines greatly between 
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1693-1715, the dummy variable that covers the largest portion of the time series will pick up this 
decline most efficiently, whether it actually explains the decline or just happens to occur 
simultaneously with the decline. Thus, the North and Weingast dummy variable will explain this 
downward shift the best because of the way it was defined, and not necessarily because it was 
the greatest cause of the decline. 
Second, the significance and the size of the North and Weingast coefficient hinges on the 
first two observations. If we remove the 1693 and the 1694 data points, the significance of the 
North and Weingast variable disappears and its coefficient size drops dramatically (see the third 
regression). The government interest rates, from which these first few data points were 
calculated, were exceptionally high. The political and economic unrest that most certainly 
affected the interest rates, unfortunately, can not be separated from the events North and 
Weingast describe by using dummy variables; however, if we eliminate these two data points, 
the North and Weingast coefficient becomes insignificant. The lack of consistency in the size 
and significance of this coefficient makes its use as a measurement of the validity of the theory 
questionable. 
Another, more tangible method of analyzing how well the independent variables explain 
the interest rate differential is to compare the predicted values for the differential from the 
regressions against the actual values. If the predicted values closely follow the actual values, 
then the independent variables included are good estimators of the interest rate differential. 
We can compare how well military expenditures alone predict the differential by 
regressing the differential on military expenditures separately from the period variables and then 
plotting the predicted values of this regression against the actual interest rate differentials. If the 
predicted values follow the actual values closely, and if there is little difference in the plot of the 
predicted values using all the variables and the plot using just military expenditures, then most 
of the variance in the interest rate differential can be explained by changes in military 
expenditures. 
The results are found irrFigures 3-6. - Figure 3 depicts the plot of predicted values from 
regressing the interest rate differential on military expenditures and the dummy variables for the 
periods beginning in 1697 and 1714. Figure 4 shows the predicted values from replacing the 
1697-1800 variable with the 1726-1800 variable. Figure 5 depicts the regression with military 
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expenditures alone and Figure 6 displays the regression with military expenditures and the 17 14-
1800 dummy variable. A comparison of the plots indicate that military expenditures drive the 
results in Figures 3, 4, and 6. Comparing Figures 4 and 6, we see that the only additional 
explanatory power gained by including the Neal variable is for the first two observations. The 
North and Weingast variable ( 1697-1800) adds little additional explanatory power. Military 
expenditures and the Brewer variable capture about the same degree of variation in the predicted 
interest rate differential as the predicted series generated from military expenditures and the North 
and Weingast variable. 
Thus, events associated with the 1726-1800 variable do not appear to have driven the 
interest rate differential down significantly, and while the other two variables explain the decline 
better, the coefficient for the North and Weingast variable is not consistent when the first two 
data points are not included. Though North and Weingast credit the institutional innovations of 
the post-Glorious Revolution era for the sharp decline in government rates, the test results reveal 
that if data prior to the creation of the Bank are removed, then the innovations are no longer a 
significant factor in lowering rates. The Brewer variable appears to explain a portion of the 
decline in interest rates, but as mentioned above, this result is questionable because the dummy 
variable may have picked up the overall decline in interest rates without actually being 
· responsible for it. 
Military expenditures as a percentage of national income, however, did strongly affect the 
decline in the differential, a relationship that suggests the differential was, in part, a product of 
war fears. Examining this relationship more closely, we concur with B arro (1987) that 
fluctuations in government long-term rates and military expenditures are strongly related. The 
same relationship, however, does not hold with private interest rates and military expenditures. 
This result along with the fact that the private rates rarely hit the usury ceiling allow us to reject 
the notion that government debt was crowding out private long-term investment.16
16 Crowding out may occur when the government is issuing large amounts of debt at high
interest rates. If such an event took place in England during wars, we would expect to 
see private rates fluctuating with war expenditures and hitting the usury ceiling frequently. 
From the interest rates collected, we found no evidence of such events occurring; 
therefore, we may conclude that crowding out did not play significant role in British 
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Because crowding out does not play a role in the financial markets, fluctuations in the risk 
premium over the period largely can be attributed to the government's credit worthiness as 
perceived by investors. Large-scale wars damaged this worthiness because of the "risks" facing 
the government: the possibility in the early wars of the government being overthrown and the 
high probability it would still default on its debt obligations. Thus, the downward drift in the 
interest rate differential that occurred after 1713 and, also, to a smaller extent after 1749, 1763, 
and 1784, was not primarily the result of a credible commitment by Parliament, the increased 
liquidity of long-term assets, or the stabilization of the tax system but of periods of peace that 
allowed the government to repair its credit worthiness damaged by wartime risks. 
4. Conclusions
North and Weingast, Neal, and Brewer fail to credit the significant influence of war on 
the risk premium. The Crown faced substantial risk when England engaged in war with other 
countries. The chances of military defeat were not insignificant; and lenders to the Crown knew 
that, if a foreign government took control, the likelihood of being repaid was small. Dickson 
suggests governmental instability as one reason that long-term government loans were looked 
upon with much skepticism before the Glorious Revolution-frequent wars dispelled dreams of 
profitable long-term investments in the government (Dickson, 1967, pp. 46-47). 
The other component of risk was default. North and Weingast suggest that the 
government's  credible commitment secured by the set of institutional innovations caused the 
sharp decline in government interest rates. When examined more closely, however, the evidence 
suggests a slow decline in interest rates. If credible commitment alleviated most of the risk 
associated with government loans, then government rates should converge on private rates sooner 
than 1715. Moreover, the results of regression analysis show that when the first data points are 
omitted, the institutional innovations of the immediate post-Glorious Revolution period do not 
appear to have triggered the decline in the risk premium. Instead, the change in military 
expenditures over the period account for a 30% drop, on average, in the interest rate differential. 
financial markets during this period. 
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Further research in this area should examine more closely the role played by the Bank of 
England in extending loans to the government and Whig-Tory attempts to manipulate 
Parliamentary and Crown financial decisions. 
The qualitative and quantitative analysis substantiates the belief that a mature capital 
market did not develop in England until well into the eighteenth century. The research 
demonstrates that government interest rates on long-term loans remained considerably higher than 
similar private rates until almost thirty years after the reforms of the Glorious Revolution. 
Additional support for this claim is found in the analysis designed to remove inflationary 
expectations from the government interest rate and examine the trend in real government interest 
rates over the period. Also, the analysis shows that the sharp rise in interest rates in 1693 and 
in 1710, and the subsequent decline in rates by 1697 and by 1713, respectively, can be explained 
by political events associated with the wars fought during those periods. 
Moreover, the relationship between war and the interest rate differential suggests that the 
risks reflected in the high government rates were due to factors other than the inability of the 
Crown to make credible commitments, the increased liquidity gained from the creation of a 
secondary market for credit, or the stability of revenues from a revised tax system. The fears that 
the war might be lost and the government would default on its loans determined the riskiness of 
long-term loans. Indeed, military expenditures continued to influence the risk premium well into 
the eighteenth century. 
As the analysis demonstrated, the risks associated with war continued to explain, to a 
large degree, the rise and the fall in the interest rate differential across the five major wars that 
England participated in between 1714 and 1800. Thus, the evolution of capital markets in post­
Revolution England may have originated in the reforms of the late seventeenth century, but the 
beneficial effects were not immediate, and they were influenced by factors other than the 
institutional innovations of the period or the liquidity of the long-term assets. 
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Table 1: 17th and 18th Century Wars Involving England 
1689-1697 
1702-1713 
1739-1748 
1756-1763 
1775-1784 
Source: Brewer (1989) 
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Nine Years War 
War of Spanish Succession 
War of Austrian Succession 
Seven Years War 
American War 
Table 2: Major Military Setbacks and Long-Term Borrowing 
Date Sum Raised (£) 
1689 
1691 
1692 
Jan. 1693 108,100 
773,394 
Winter 1 693-94 
Feb. 1694 1 18,506 
Mar. 1694 1,000,000 
Apr. 1694 1,200,000 
300,000 
1697 
Apr. 1697 17,630 
Sept. 1697 
Jul. 1698 2,000,000 
Sources: Dickson (1967), Harris (1963) 
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Event 
-War declared against France 
-France captures Mons 
-France captures Fortress of 
Namur 
-(1) Long-term lottery loan 
issued at interest rate of 10% 
(failed to raise funds) 
-(2) Long-term annuity issued at 
14% 
-Bloody defeat of British army 
at Landen 
-Long-term annuity issued at 
14% 
-Long-term lottery loan issued 
at 14% 
-(1) Long-term annuity issued at 
8% plus incorporated as 
member in Bank of England 
-(2) Long-term annuities issued 
at 14%, 12%, and 10% for one, 
two and three term lives, 
respectively. 
-Peak year in military 
expenditures (height of war) 
-Long-term lottery loan issued 
at 6.3% (failed to raise funds) 
-End of War with France 
-Long-term annuity issued at 
8% 
Table 3: Interest Rate Differential Regressed On Military Expenditure and Dummy 
Variables 
Independent 
Variable 
one 
Military 
Expenditure 
d( l  727- 1 800) 
d(17 14- 1800) 
Number of Observations: 
R-Squared: 
one 
Military 
Expenditure 
d(1697-1800) 
d(1714- 1 800) 
Number of Observations: 
R-Squared: 
one 
Military 
Expenditure 
d(l 697-1 800) 
d(17 14- 1 800) 
Number of Observations: 
R-Squared: 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
0.022 
0.212 
-0.007 
-0.026 
0.064 
0. 1 90
-0.049 
-0.025 
-0.001 
0. 188
0.016 
-0.024 
53 
0.5838 
53 
0.77 1 8  
5 1  
0.6245 
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Standard 
Error 
0.004 
0.068 
0.007 
0.008 
0.007 
0.048 
0.007 
0.003 
0.000 
0.046 
0.000 
0.003 
t-SratNic 
4.44 
3 . 15  
-0.92 
-3.26 
8.69 
3.93 
-6.47 
-7. 1 8  
-0.00 
4. 1 1
0.00 
-7.57 
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